

# **Control Hijacking**

# Control Hijacking: Defenses

# Recap: control hijacking attacks

**Stack smashing**: overwrite return address or function pointer

Heap spraying: reliably exploit a heap overflow

**Use after free**: attacker writes to freed control structure, which then gets used by victim program

**Integer overflows** 

Format string vulnerabilities

- •
- •

# The mistake: mixing data and control


- An ancient design flaw:
  - enables anyone to inject control signals



• 1971: AT&T learns never to mix control and data

# Control hijacking attacks

The problem: mixing data with control flow in memory



Later we will see that mixing data and code is also the reason for XSS, a common web vulnerability

# Preventing hijacking attacks

- 1. <u>Fix bugs</u>:
  - Audit software
    - Automated tools: Coverity, Infer, ... (more on this next week)
  - Rewrite software in a type safe languange (Java, Go, Rust)
    - Difficult for existing (legacy) code ...
- 2. Platform defenses: prevent attack code execution Tra
- 3. Harden executable to detect control hijacking
  - Halt process and report when exploit detected
  - StackGuard, ShadowStack, Memory tagging, ...

Transform: Complete Breach Denial of service



# **Control Hijacking**

# **Platform Defenses**

### Marking memory as non-execute (DEP)

Prevent attack code execution by marking stack and heap as **non-executable** 

- NX-bit on AMD64, XD-bit on Intel x86 (2005), XN-bit on ARM
  - disable execution: an attribute bit in every Page Table Entry (PTE)
- <u>Deployment</u>:
  - All major operating systems
    - Windows DEP: since XP SP2 (2004)
      - Visual Studio: /NXCompat[:NO]
- Limitations:
  - Some apps need executable heap (e.g. JITs).
  - Can be easily bypassed using Return Oriented Programming (ROP)


### Examples: DEP controls in Windows



#### DEP terminating a program

#### Attack: Return Oriented Programming (ROP)


Control hijacking without injecting code:



# ROP: in more detail


To run /bin/sh we must direct *stdin* and *stdout* to the socket:

dup2(s, 0)// map stdin to socketdup2(s, 1)// map stdout to socketexecve("/bin/sh", 0, 0);



# ROP: in even more detail

*dup2(s,0)* implemented as a sequence of gadgets in victim code:



### What to do?? Randomization

- **<u>ASLR</u>**: (Address Space Layout Randomization)
  - Randomly shift location of all code in process memory
    - $\Rightarrow$  Attacker cannot jump directly to exec function
  - <u>Deployment</u>: (/DynamicBase)
    - Windows 7: 8 bits of randomness for DLLs
      - aligned to 64K page in a 16MB region  $\Rightarrow$  256 choices
    - Windows 8: 24 bits of randomness on 64-bit processors
- Other randomization ideas (not used in practice):
  - Sys-call randomization: randomize sys-call id's
  - Instruction Set Randomization (ISR)

# ASLR Example

#### Booting twice loads libraries into different locations:


ntlanman.dll	0x6D7F0000	Microsoft® Lan Manager
ntmarta.dll	0x75370000	Windows NT MARTA provider
ntshrui.dll	0x6F2C0000	Shell extensions for sharing
ole32.dll	0x76160000	Microsoft OLE for Windows

ntlanman.dll	0x6DA90000	Microsoft® Lan Manager
ntmarta.dll	0x75660000	Windows NT MARTA provider
ntshrui.dll	0x6D9D0000	Shell extensions for sharing
ole32.dll	0x763C0000	Microsoft OLE for Windows

Note: everything in process memory must be randomly shifted stack, heap, shared libs, base image

• Win 8 Force ASLR: ensures all loaded modules use ASLR

### A very different idea: kBouncer (2012)




Observation: abnormal execution sequence

• ret returns to an address that does not follow a call

Idea: before a syscall, check that every prior ret is not abnormal

• How: use Intel's *Last Branch Recording* (LBR)

# A very different idea: kBouncer



Inte's Last Branch Recording (LBR):

- store 16 last executed branches in a set of on-chip registers (MSR)
- read using *rdmsr* instruction from privileged mode

kBouncer: before entering kernel, verify that last 16 rets are normal

- Requires no app. code changes, and minimal overhead
- Limitations: attacker can ensure 16 calls prior to syscall are valid




### **Control Hijacking Defenses**

# Hardening the executable

### Run time checking: StackGuard

- Many run-time checking techniques ...
  - we only discuss methods relevant to overflow protection
- <u>Solution 1</u>: StackGuard
  - Run time tests for stack integrity.
  - Embed "canaries" in stack frames and verify their integrity prior to function return.



# **Canary Types**

- <u>Random canary:</u>
  - Random string chosen at program startup.
  - Insert canary string into every stack frame.
  - Verify canary before returning from function.
    - Exit program if canary changed. Turns potential exploit into DoS.
  - To corrupt, attacker must learn current random string.
- <u>Terminator canary:</u> Canary = {0, newline, linefeed, EOF}
  - String functions will not copy beyond terminator.
  - Attacker cannot use string functions to corrupt stack.


# StackGuard (Cont.)

StackGuard implemented as a GCC patch
 Program must be recompiled

• Minimal performance effects: 8% for Apache

# StackGuard enhancement: ProPolice

- ProPolice since gcc 3.4.1. (-fstack-protector)
  - Rearrange stack layout to prevent ptr overflow.



# MS Visual Studio /GS [since 2003]

#### Compiler /GS option:

- Combination of ProPolice and Random canary.
- If cookie mismatch, default behavior is to call \_\_exit(3)

Function prolog:		
<pre>sub esp, 8 // allocate 8 bytes for cookie</pre>		
mov eax, DWORD PTRsecurity_cookie		
<b>xor</b> eax, esp // xor cookie with current esp		
mov DWORD PTR [esp+8], eax // save in stack		

Function epilog:
mov ecx, DWORD PTR [esp+8]
xor ecx, esp
call @security_check_cookie@4
add esp, 8

#### Enhanced /GS in Visual Studio 2010:


- /GS protection added to all functions, unless can be proven unnecessary

# Evading /GS with exception handlers

• When exception is thrown, dispatcher walks up exception list until handler is found (else use default handler)

After overflow: handler points to attacker's code exception triggered  $\Rightarrow$  control hijack

Main point: exception is triggered before canary is checked



# Defenses: SAFESEH and SEHOP

#### • /SAFESEH: linker flag

- Linker produces a binary with a table of safe exception handlers
- System will not jump to exception handler not on list

#### • /SEHOP: platform defense (since win vista SP1)

- Observation: SEH attacks typically corrupt the "next" entry in SEH list.
- SEHOP: add a dummy record at top of SEH list
- When exception occurs, dispatcher walks up list and verifies dummy record is there. If not, terminates process.


# Summary: Canaries are not full proof

- Canaries are an important defense tool, but do not prevent all control hijacking attacks:
  - Some stack smashing attacks leave canaries unchanged: how?
  - Heap-based attacks still possible
  - Integer overflow attacks still possible
  - /GS by itself does not prevent Exception Handling attacks (also need SAFESEH and SEHOP)

# Even worse: canary extraction

A common design for crash recovery:


- When process crashes, restart automatically (for availability)
- Often canary is unchanged (reason: relaunch using fork)



# Similarly: extract ASLR randomness

A common design for crash recovery:

- When process crashes, restart automatically (for availability)
- Often canary is unchanged (reason: relaunch using fork)



# More methods: Shadow Stack

Shadow Stack: keep a <u>copy</u> of the stack in memory

- **On call**: push ret-address to shadow stack on call
- **On ret**: check that top of shadow stack is equal to ret-address on stack. Crash if not.
- Security: memory corruption should not corrupt shadow stack

Shadow stack using Intel CET: (supported in Windows 10, 2020)

- New register SSP: shadow stack pointer
- Shadow stack pages marked by a new "shadow stack" attribute: only "call" and "ret" can read/write these pages

# ARM Memory Tagging Extension (MTE)

# Idea: (1) every 64-bit **memory pointer** P has a 4-bit "tag" (in top byte)


(2) every 16-byte user **memory region** R has a 4-bit "tag"

#### Processor ensures that: if P is used to read R then tags are equal — otherwise: hardware exception

Tags are created using new HW instructions:

- LDG, STG: load and store tag to a memory region (use by malloc and free)
- ADDG, SUBG: pointer arithmetic on an address preserving tags

#### Tags prevent buffer overflows and use after free



- (3) delete [] p; // memory is re-tagged from **B** to **E**
- (4) p[7] = 'a'; //  $B \neq E \implies$  tag mismatch exception (use after free)

Note: out of bounds access to p[44] at (2) will not be caught.




### **Control Hijacking Defenses**

# Control Flow Integrity (CFI)

# Control flow integrity (CFI) [ABEL'05, ...]

Ultimate Goal: ensure control flows as specified by code's flow graph



Lots of academic research on CFI systems:

• CCFIR (2013), kBouncer (2013), FECFI (2014), CSCFI (2015), ...

and many attacks ...

# Control Flow Guard (CFG) (Windows 10)

Poor man's version of CFI:

• Protects indirect calls by checking against a bitmask of all valid function entry points in executable

rep st	osd	· · · · ·
mov mov push call call	<pre>esi, [esi] ecx, esi ; Target 1 @_guard_check_icall@4 ; _guard_check_icall(x) esi</pre>	ensures target is the entry point of a function
add xor	esp, 4 eax, eax	[]

# Control Flow Guard (CFG) and CET

Poor		
• Pr fu		valid
rep s mov mov push call	flow graph statically <pre>@_guaro_cneck_icall@4 ; _guaro_cneck_icall(x)</pre>	s of a
add	esi esp, 4	
xor	eax, eax	

# An example


```
void HandshakeHandler(Session *s, char *pkt) {
```

```
s->hdlr = &LoginHandler;
```

```
... Buffer overflow over Session struct ...
```

```
void LoginHandler(Session *s, char *pkt) {
    bool auth = CheckCredentials(pkt);
    s->dhandler = &DataHandler;
}
```

void DataHandler(Session \*s, char \*pkt);



```
static CFI: attacker can call
DataHandler to
bypass authentication
```

#### Cryptographic Control Flow Integrity (CCFI) (ARM pointer authentication)

<u>Threat model</u>: attacker can read/write **anywhere** in memory, program should not deviate from its control flow graph

**<u>CCFI approach</u>**: Every time a jump address is written/copied anywhere in memory: compute 64-bit AES-MAC and append to address

On heap: tag = AES(k, (jump-address, 0 ll source-address)) on stack: tag = AES(k, (jump-address, 1 ll stack-frame))

Before following address, verify AES-MAC and crash if invalid

Where to store key k? In xmm registers (not memory)

# Back to the example

```
void HandshakeHandler(Session *s, char *pkt) {
```

```
s->hdlr = &LoginHandler;
```

```
... Buffer overflow in Session struct ...
```

```
void LoginHandler(Session *s, char *pkt) {
    bool auth = CheckCredentials(pkt);
    s->dhandler = &DataHandler;
}
```

```
Attacker controls handler
```

CCFI: Attacker cannot create a valid MAC for **DataHandler** address

void DataHandler(Session \*s, char \*pkt);

### THE END